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I. INTRODUCTION

During 2005, natural disasters affected over 161 million people
worldwide, killing almost 89,000 people.' Almost every day disasters kill
or leave homeless a significant number of people The annual property
damage from disasters is tens of billions of dollars.3 Disasters causing
tens of millions of dollars of damage occur somewhere in the world about
twice a day,4 and twice a month in the United States Over the past
thirty years, the number of people affected by disasters has continually
increased, although the number killed has declined.6
Following a disaster, victims often need help satisfying their immediate
needs for food, housing, and medical care, as well as help locating family
members.7 Some aid comes from local, state, and federal governments. 8
In many instances government resources are insufficient to satisfy the
disaster victims' needs, especially following large scale disaster. 9 Other
aid comes from private disaster relief organizations (DROs), which

1. INT'L FED'N OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOC'YS, WORLD DISASTERS
REPORT 195 (2006).

2.

See Francine J. Lipman, Anatomy of a Disaster Under the Internal Revenue Code,

6 FLA. TAX REV. 953, 958 (2005) (noting the fact that major disasters occur worldwide
twice a day, and in the United States twice a month).
3. INT'L FED'N OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, WORLD
DISASTERS REPORT 173 (2002) (reporting that the average annual damage from disasters
during the prior decade was $69 billion).
4. Lipman, supra note 2, at 958.

5.

Id.

INT'L FED'N OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES supranote 3, at 173;
see also Roger Bennett & Rita Kottasz, Emergency Fund-Raising for Disaster Relief, 9
6.

DISASTER PREVENTION & MGMT. 352, 352 (2000) ("Disasters are an integral part of life,
and their incidence is increasing."). There is evidence that although disaster relief
organizations may be improving in their ability to respond to disasters, the number of
disasters is increasing. D. Clay Whybark, Issues in Managing Disaster Relief Inventories,
108 INT. J. PROD. ECON. 228, 229 (2007).
7. See HARRY HATRY, MARTIN ABRAVANEL & SHELLI ROSSMAN, THE URBAN
INSTITUTE, WHAT HAPPENS TO VICTIMS? A RESEARCH GUIDE FOR DISASTERRESPONSE STUDIES 4 (2006) (listing the types of services likely to be needed by disaster
victims). This Article will not discuss the role of insurance in meeting either the short- or
long-term needs of disaster victims.

8.

David W. Sar, Helping Hands: Aid for Natural Disaster Homeless vs. Aid for

"Ordinary Homeless", 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV., Winter 1995, at 129, 133 ("[Sjtate and
federal governments give the most money aid today... [for] disaster relief.").
9. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-712, HURRICANES
KATRINA AND RITA: COORDINATION BETWEEN FEMA AND THE RED CROSS SHOULD
BE IMPROVED FOR THE 2006 HURRICANE SEASON 17 (2006) (noting that both
government agencies and private organizations were overwhelmed after Hurricane
Katrina).
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provide essential aid to victims and reduce the burden on government. 10
These organizations are primarily funded by contributions from
individuals and businesses.
After a mega-disaster like Hurricane Katrina, massive aid is needed,
making the delivery of aid a major logistical challenge." Following a
mega-disaster, even combined government and private efforts may be
unable to meet
2 the immediate and long-term needs of those affected by
the disaster.'
Charitable organizations such as the American Red Cross and the
Salvation Army assist victims of a variety of disasters. 3 In addition,
following many disasters, new charities are often formed to help the
victims of a specific disaster. For example, the Twin Towers Fund, 4
which was formed after the 9/11 terror attacks, was organized specifically
to aid the victims in the World Trade Center and their families.'5
DROs, which encompass both broad scope charitable organizations
like the Red Cross and specific purpose charities, ease the societal
burdens created by disasters in at least two ways. First, DROs reduce the
cost, types, and extent of services that the government must provide
during and immediately following a disaster to meet disaster victims'
basic needs. 6 Second, DROs may be able to distribute aid to victims

10. See id. at 7 (describing the disaster relief efforts of the American Red Cross); Sar,
supra note 8, at 133 ("[P]rivate and nonprofit aid still play a significant role in disaster
relief."); see also infra note 13 and accompanying text.
11. See HATRY, ABRAVANEL & ROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 4; U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, at 8 ("After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the
Red Cross estimated that it will have provided more than 3.7 million hurricane victims
with financial assistance, 3.4 million overnight stays in almost 1,100 shelters, and more
than 27.4 million hot meals and 25.2 million snacks for survivors of the Gulf Coast
hurricanes.").
12. See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
13. See generally American Red Cross, Disaster Services, http://www.redcross.org/
services/disaster/0,1082,0_319_,00.html; The Salvation Army, Our Role in Disaster
Services, http://www.salvationarmyusa.org/usn/www-usn.nsflvw-text-dynamic-arrays/8214
F21A914E09CE80256FE80071ECF1?openDocument.
14. The Twin Towers Fund was one of 250 new charitable relief organizations formed
in the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks. CHARITIES BUREAU, STATE OF N.Y. OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GEN., SEPTEMBER 11TH CHARITABLE RELIEF: AN OVERVIEW AT ONE

YEAR 2, 13, 16 (2002).
15. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-1037, SEPTEMBER 11: INTERIM
REPORT ON THE RESPONSE OF CHARITIES 10, 36 (2002).
16. See American Red Cross, supra note 13 (providing an overview of the disaster
relief services of the Red Cross and noting that "[ejach year, the American Red Cross
responds immediately to more than 70,000 disasters, including house or apartment fires ...
hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, tornadoes, hazardous materials spills, transportation
accidents, explosions, and other natural and man-made disasters," which obviously helps
reduce the amount of services the government must provide).
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1 7
more quickly, effectively, and efficiently than government agencies.
Established national and international organizations, such as the
Salvation Army, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the
American Red Cross, have extensive networks of volunteers and engage
in extensive advanced planning for a wide range of scenarios involving
the types of disasters that are most likely to occur.18 This may permit
DROs to be on the ground with supplies and volunteers quickly, without
the delay required by the bureaucratic machinations of modern
government. Widespread networks of volunteers and resources also help
reduce the cost to government and alleviate some of the need for local,
state, and federal governments to keep disaster relief supplies and
personnel on hand. 9
The National Response Plan provides for the Red Cross and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to coordinate efforts
following an "incident[] of national significance" resulting from a major
natural disaster or terror attack.2 However, given the need to obtain
cooperation among entities and individuals, the theory and promise of
the National Response Plan may not work out in practice, as
demonstrated during the post-Katrina relief efforts.'

17. See Imagining America, Hurricane Katrina Web Resource, Faith-Based Groups,
http://www.imaginingamerica.org/katrina-faith-based-groups.html
(discussing the relief
efforts of private faith-based groups after Hurricane Katrina and noting that "many of
these organizations' relief workers mobilized more quickly and effectively than federal
emergency workers"); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 15
("[C]harities are expected to be among the first agencies to provide assistance to those
affected [in the event of a presidentially declared disaster] ....
18. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
19. See Sar, supra note 8, at 133 (discussing the Los Angeles earthquake relief efforts,
and noting that "[t]he Salvation Army, Red Cross, and other national organizations
naturally take on more of the relief effort. They supply volunteers, food, water, and...
shelter.").
20. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, at 1. The efficacy of this
plan was called into question following Hurricane Katrina, the first situation in which the
National Response Plan was put into action. See, e.g., id. at 3-4.
21. See Whybark, supra note 6, at 229 (discussing the difficulties both governmental
agencies and nongovernmental organizations have in getting quick relief to disaster
victims). The effectiveness of both private and government agencies at providing
immediate aid to the victims of major disasters may be questioned in light of the problems
that were encountered in rendering aid to the victims of Hurricane Katrina in August
2005. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer & Eric Lipton, FEMA, Slow to the Rescue, Now
Stumbles in Aid Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2005, at Al; Stephanie Strom & Campbell
Robertson, As Its Coffers Swell, Red Cross is Criticized on Gulf Coast Response, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2005, at A24; John Tierney, Op-Ed., From FEMA to WEMA, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2005, at A29. But see Michael Luo & Campbell Robertson, A New
Meaning for 'Organized Religion': It Helps the Needy Quickly, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005,
at A18. Critics also have raised concerns about the use of donations by the American Red
Cross with respect to the 9/11 terror attacks. See David Barstow, In Congress, Harsh
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Funding for charitable organizations is encouraged by the tax system,
Economic
which permits a deduction for certain contributions."
literature shows that the availability of a tax deduction increases
charitable contributions, but a tax deduction or other tax benefit does
not explain all charitable giving." Many individuals who make charitable
contributions do not itemize their deductions and, therefore, cannot
benefit from current tax incentives for charitable contributions. 4
Over the past twenty years, a number of record-setting disasters,
measured in size, deaths, and scale of property damage, have occurred in
the United States and abroad, including Hurricane Hugo (1989),
Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki (1992), the Northridge Earthquake (1994),
the 9/11 terror attacks (2001), Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and
Jeanne (2004), the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004), Hurricanes Katrina,
Rita, and Wilma (2005),25 and the San Diego Fires (2007).26 As this
Article discusses, Congress has intervened after disasters to create tax
incentives for individuals to give to charities and DROs, as well as to
provide additional tax relief to victims on their losses and prevent victim
relief payments from inclusion in income. 2' However, this favorable tax

Words for Red Cross, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2001, at B1 (discussing the congressional fallout
from the Red Cross's decision to redirect 9/11 contributions); see also Diana B. Henriques
& David Barstow, Red Cross Pledges Entire Fund to Sept. 11 Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
2001, at Al (discussing the Red Cross's change of position on the use of contributions for
9/11 terror attack victims).
22. I.R.C. § 170(c) (2000).
23. See Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA.
L. REV. 1393, 1430 (1988) (discussing studies on psychological and sociological reasons for
charitable giving).
24.

DAVID JOULFAIAN, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, OTA PAPER 95, BASIC

FACTS ON CHARITABLE GIVING 16-17 (2005) (indicating that in 2002 there were 158,000
returns reporting an additional $200 million in charitable contributions with no
deduction). Because many taxpayers do not itemize, the contributions reported on
individual tax returns likely understate the true value of nondeductible charitable
contributions. In recent years a number of proposals have been made to permit a
charitable deduction, even to taxpayers who do not itemize. See e.g., Charitable Giving
Act of 2005, H.R. 3908, 109th Cong. § 101 (2005) (introduced in the House, but not passed
during the 2005 legislative session); CARE Act of 2005, S. 1780, 109th Cong. § 101 (2005)
(introduced in the Senate, but not passed during the 2005 legislative session). Even among
itemizers, not all contributions are deducted for a variety of reasons, including lack of
adequate documentation and deduction limitations.
25. See Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., The Flurry of Tax Law Changes Following the 2005
Hurricanes:A Strategy for More Predictable and Equitable Tax Treatment of Victims, 72
BROOK. L. REV. 799, 813-29 (2007) (discussing the tax relief provided after each disaster).
26. See Jeff McDonald & Liz Neely, 300,000 Flee Fires, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Oct. 23, 2007, at Al (quoting San Diego county Sheriff Bill Kolender as saying "[i]t's
probably the worst fire this county has ever had").
27. See infra Part II.C-D.
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treatment has been inconsistent because Congress has intervened
following some, but not all, disasters.8
Until relatively recently, Congress generally provided few added
incentives following a major disaster to encourage giving and little
additional relief to disaster victims beyond the casualty loss, insurance,
and relief provisions already included in the Internal Revenue Code (the
Code). Nonetheless, the Department of Treasury and the Internal
Revenue Service (the Service) exercised their available discretion to
provide extensions and other procedural relief to victims of a wide range
of disasters. 9 Following some of the largest recent disasters, Congress
has created some additional tax incentives for charitable contributions
and permitted additional tax relief to disaster victims.3 °
The additional tax relief for donors to and victims of some disasters
causes disparate tax treatment vis-A-vis donors to and victims of other
disasters. Many disasters do not result in a large enough number of
deaths and injuries, or cause a sufficient amount of property damage to
attract the media's, Congress's and the public's attention long enough to
lead to legislative change. Unfortunately for the victims, however, the
magnitude of a disaster does not determine the extent of harm to the
victims who are displaced, injured, or otherwise harmed by the disaster.
The treatment of both victims and donors providing aid after recent
disasters has differed from disaster to disaster." As a result, charitable
organizations may not be able to provide the same amount of assistance
in all disasters, even though such organizations may be of paramount
importance to victims unable or ineligible to receive assistance from
governmental agencies. A person who has the misfortune of not only
suffering physical harm, property damage, or loss of life during a disaster,
but also experiences that harm as a result of a disaster that did not
receive much media coverage -because
there was very limited
geographic damage or the disaster was not spectacular-is no less a
victim and no less in need of assistance. However, with less publicity,
less aid may be available after a smaller scale disaster because there may
be fewer targeted donations and fewer tax benefits for victims unless the
disaster area becomes a Presidentially declared disaster.32 The lack of
support for these victims is particularly troubling given that smaller
disasters occur more frequently and impact more people.33
28. See
29. See
30. See
Katrina).
31. See
32. See
33. See

Tolan, supra note 25, at 813-29.
id. at 813-17, 820.
id. at 818, 822 (discussing tax legislation passed after 9/11 and Hurricane
infra Part III.
infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
infra note 78 and accompanying text.
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Major disasters present their own challenges. Victims face the
difficulty of meeting their immediate survival needs. They may also face
other challenges. The formation of many new DROs in the wake of a
mega-disaster can create a chaotic situation in which victims have
difficulty obtaining available aid. 4 This may result from differing rules
for obtaining aid from various DROs and government agencies, as well
as the need to complete multiple applications.
In the case of each disaster for which Congress provided relief through
tax legislation, the relief differed in kind and extent. Tax relief
legislation followed only the disasters that received extraordinary media
coverage and involved a large number of victims. Moreover, the amount
of disaster relief available may be influenced not only by the media
coverage of the disaster, but also by the tax treatment of donations.
This article advocates a consistent approach to the tax treatment of
disasters, both with respect to charitable contributions to DROs and the
treatment of disaster victims. Consistent treatment of DRO donors and
relief recipients would increase both horizontal and vertical equity
among donors and disaster victims, improve efficiency, and add certainty
of results in the tax system. Consistent treatment of victims will increase
the likelihood that victims of one disaster are not disadvantaged vis-A-vis
victims of another disaster. Most important, a consistent approach could
help ensure that needed aid is available to all disaster victims. Part II will
discuss the charitable deduction currently available for those who
contribute to charitable organizations generally, as well as the temporary
tax relief afforded to contributions to relief efforts from the 2004 tsunami
and Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. This Part will also discuss the
tax consequences of property damage and payments from DROs and
government agencies to disaster victims. Part III will discuss the
rationales that are available to justify preferred tax treatment for
charitable contributions. Part IV will discuss the pitfalls that may result
from the massive outpouring of charitable aid that often occurs in
response to a mega-disaster, using the 9/11 terrorist attacks as an
example. Part V will explain how a consistent approach to charitable
contributions, especially to DROs, could benefit all disaster victims. Part
V will also discuss how a consistent approach to taxing disaster relief
payments could further the goals of equity, efficiency, and certainty in

34.

See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 3 ("While charitable

organizations took immediate steps to get aid to those in need [after 9/11], families of
victims generally believed they had to navigate a maze of service providers, and confusion
existed about the range of services available to people, particularly those facing job or
housing losses.").
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the tax system. 35 This Article concludes that the tax treatment of donors
and disaster victims should be established prior to the occurrence of the
disaster. Congress should avoid post-disaster temporary tax legislation
as a means to aid disaster relief efforts. Moreover, further study should
be used to identify the most effective ways to encourage contributions to
disaster relief efforts, and to ensure that victims quickly and efficiently
receive needed aid. Finally, if different scales of disasters warrant
different tax treatment, that should be established in advance, along with
the criteria for determining when a disaster warrants additional relief, as
after the fact tax relief is not an efficient or effective means of addressing
the immediate needs of disaster victims.

II. TAX CONSEQUENCES TO DONORS AND DISASTER VICTIMS
A. In General
United States citizens are very generous in supporting charitable
organizations.36 Adoption of the income tax raised concerns that citizens
might reduce their charitable giving, so the charitable deduction was
created to prevent such a result.37 The charitable deduction was first
permitted in 1917 for contributions made to certain tax-exempt
organizations, including religious, charitable, scientific, public safety
testing, community service, literary, or educational organizations."
In 2002, individuals reported making $108 billion in cash contributions
to charitable organizations. 9 Following a disaster, individuals and
businesses frequently donate not only cash, but also food, shelter,
expertise, and time to DROs.
Historically, the tax treatment of contributions to and payments from
DROs has not varied much from disaster to disaster. For example, after
Hurricane Hugo in 1989, Congress did not provide any additional tax
4
relief to the victims or incentives to increase charitable contributions. 0
Similarly, after Hurricane Andrew in 1992, although Congress provided
minimal additional tax relief for victims, there were no additional

35. But see Hurricane Katrina: Community Rebuilding Needs and Effectiveness of
Past Proposals: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. 131 (2005)
[hereinafter Katrina Hearing] (testimony of George K. Yin, Chief of Staff, Joint Comm.
on Taxation) ("Disasters by their nature are location specific, and thus any tax measures
to be considered as relief for those disasters will in general be location specific.").
36. See infra notes 39, 44, 47-48.
37. Gergen, supra note 23, at 1396.
38. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000); Gergen, supra note 23, at 1396.
39.

JOULFAIAN, supra note 24, at 4.

40.

See Tolan, supra note 25, at 813.
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incentives for giving to DROs4
Once again, following the 1994
Northridge Earthquake in Los Angeles, neither the victims nor donors
received additional tax relief.4 Recently, however, Congress has taken a
more active role in encouraging giving to DROs following certain
disasters, as well as providing tax relief to the victims of those disasters.
Congress has done this through post-disaster temporary relief
legislation.
With or without tax incentives for charitable giving, people in the
United States tend to be generous. After the 9/11 terrorist attackswhich killed 2,749 people when two planes crashed into the World Trade
Center, 184 when a third plane crashed into the Pentagon, and 40 when
passengers brought down a fourth plane in a Pennsylvania field-U.S.
charities received $2.4 billion to aid the victims of the attacks and their
families. 4 After the attacks, up to two-thirds of United States
households contributed to victim relief funds.4 When a tsunami struck
the coastal cities along the Indian Ocean on December 26, 2004, U.S.
citizens (along with individuals, businesses, and governments worldwide)
rushed to make cash and in-kind contributions to aid the victims, even
though most of the victims were not U.S. citizens. 46 U.S. charities
received $1.6 billion in aid for tsunami victims.4 7 Similarly, when
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma struck the United States Gulf Coast
in rapid succession, charitable contributions poured in to the relief
efforts. U.S. charities received more than $3.3 billion after Hurricane
Katrina. 48
41. See id. at 814-15. The insured damage was more than $15.5 billion. Congress did
permit victims additional time to replace a home that was destroyed without recognizing
gain and excluded gain from some. Id.
42. See id. at 817.
43. See id. at 818, 822, 820.
44. Philip H. Brown & Jessica H. Minty, Media Coverage & Charitable Giving After
the 2004 Tsunami 2 (The William Davidson Inst. Working Paper No. 855, 2006), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=968760; Moments of Silence Mark 9/11 Anniversary, MSNBC,

Sept. 11, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5962227.
45.

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 1.

46. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Asks
Bush and Clinton to Help Raise Funds for Tsunami Relief (Jan. 3, 2005), available.at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/print/20050103-12.html.
47. Brown & Minty, supra note 44, at 2-3. Such a high level of giving may be
attributable to a number of factors, including: the closeness in time to the holiday season,
the ease of online giving, the closeness in time to the end of the taxable year, the extension
of the tax benefits of charitable contributions made for tsunami relief until January 31,
2005, and the extensive media coverage of the disaster. Id. at 5-6. The relief was donated
to United States charities because a charitable deduction is available only if contributions
are made to a domestic organization, even if it is to be used in other countries. See infra
notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
48. Brown & Minty, supra note 44, at 3.
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Some of the giving may have been encouraged, even if not caused, by
tax benefits. Congress provided donors additional tax deductions or
benefits for contributions to DROs for the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami
during 2005; and following Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma,
Congress provided tax benefits for some individuals and businesses
making charitable contributions during certain parts of 2005. 49
1. DisasterRelief Contributions
In general, a charitable deduction is available for contributions made
to qualified nonprofit organizations."
Organizations to which
contributions are deductible are a small subset of all nonprofit or taxexempt organizations. There are three requirements that a tax-exempt
organization must satisfy to entitle its contributors to a charitable
deduction. First, the organization must operate exclusively for one of the
following purposes: "religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition . . . or for the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals. 5 2 Disaster relief is considered a
charitable purpose.53 Second, the earnings of the organization must not
"inure[] to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. 5 4 Third,
the organization cannot lobby for legislation as a substantial part of its
activities and cannot participate in campaigns for political office.55
In addition to the other requirements for deductibility, charitable
contributions are usually only deductible if they are made to a domestic
entity.56 Contributions to foreign entities are not deductible, whether for
disaster relief or for any other charitable purpose, unless a bilateral
treaty provides otherwise.57 However, an individual donor can choose to
make a contribution to a foreign charity and still receive a charitable
deduction" by making her contribution to a United States charity that
49. See infra Part II.C-D; see also Tolan, supra note 25, at 826-28.
50. See generally I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (2000).
51. See id. § 170(c); 8 JASON B. BINIMOW, ET AL., MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION § 31:05 (Supp. July 2007).
52.
53.
(2006).
54.

55.

I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
John D. Columbo, In Search of Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1063, 1100
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).

Id.

56. Id. § 170(c)(2)(A).
57. David E. Pozen, Remapping the CharitableDeduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531, 540
(2006).
58. Nina J. Crimm, Through a Post-September 11 Looking Glass: Assessing the Roles
of Federal Tax Laws and Tax Policies Applicable to Global Philanthropy by Private
Foundationsand Their Donors,23 VA. TAX REV. 1, 47, 55 (2003).
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will use the funds to assist the foreign charityi 9 This is permissible,
because although a public charity, domestic charitable corporation, or
private foundation must have discretion and control over the donation, it
can use the contribution abroad to fulfill charitable purposes. 60 A second
way an individual can aid disaster victims abroad and obtain a charitable
deductions is to make the contribution to an organization that is
established in a country with which the United States has a tax treaty that
permits deductions. 6' However, corporations cannot deduct charitable
contributions unless they are used for domestic charitable purposes. 6'
The drafters of the charitable deduction did not explain the rationale
for placing geographic restrictions placed on the recipient charity's place
of formation, but not on the place of use of donated funds.63 However,
the legislative history of subsequent amendments indicates that at least
part of the rationale for the charitable deduction is that nonprofit
organizations will bear some of the burden that would otherwise be
borne by the government. 64 This is consistent with the theory that
providing a tax preference for charitable contributions is a bargain struck
between groups that independently prefer certain causes but do not
alone form the majority necessary to have the government fully fund
their cause.65 Nevertheless, Congress acknowledged that a portion of the
deductible contributions from individuals to domestic charities would be
used abroad. 66 This is less likely to reflect a bargain to support causes
lacking a majority, as foreign beneficiaries are unlikely to be contributors
to the tax system. However, if many U.S. taxpayers, but less than a
majority, want to provide aid to foreign causes or the victims of a foreign
disaster, there is little reason for those with domestic preferences to
59. Pozen, supra note 57, at 541.
60. See id.
61. Countries with which the United States has such a treaty are Canada, Mexico, and
Israel. See Crimm, supra note 58, at 51-55. Other treaties have proposed such an override
of the domestic entity restriction, but the Senate has been reluctant to allow such
provisions. See id. at 47-49 & n.138. For example, both Brazil and the United States failed
to ratify the United States-Brazil tax treaty. Id. at 51. Some have criticized the domestic
limitation on charitable contributions. Pozen, supra note 57, at 537.
62. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (2000). This article is focused primarily on individual
charitable contributions. Because the incentives for corporate philanthropy are different,
incentives for corporate philanthropy will not be addressed. However, as is often the
situation with respect to tax laws, consistency in approach over time is generally
considered desirable.
63. See Crimm, supra note 58, at 37-47.
64. See id. at 43 (discussing the legislative history to the 1938 act that made the
requirement that the recipient of a donation be a domestic charity).
65. See generally Miranda Fleischer, Why Limit Charity? (Illinois Law and Economics
Research Papers Series, Paper No. LE07-020).
66. See Crimm, supranote 58, at 43.
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object more to foreign preferences than any other preferences. 67 Other
rationales for this limitation include a concern about the inability of the
U.S. to control foreign policy or oversee and control foreign entities. 68
The charitable deduction that is available depends on the taxpayer
making the contribution and the taxpayer's income. First, the charitable
deduction is only available to individual taxpayers who itemize their
deductions.6 9 The standard deduction includes as a component of its
calculation an assumed amount of charitable contributions.70 Individuals
generally cannot deduct contributions that exceed fifty percent of their
adjusted gross income. 7'
Taxpayers can carry forward excess
contributions and deduct them in a subsequent taxable year.71
Corporations generally cannot receive charitable contribution deductions
exceeding ten percent of the corporation's taxable income.73
Many people make charitable contributions for non-tax reasons,
including a desire to give to those less fortunate, to support causes that
the individual believes are inadequately funded by the government, or to
support religious organizations that cannot be funded by the
government. Thus, many individuals make charitable contributions even
though they do not itemize their deductions and, therefore, will be
unable to receive a tax deduction for their contributions.74
There are many other factors that may influence charitable giving. For
instance, there is a strong correlation between media coverage of a
disaster and contributions to DROs aiding victims of that disaster.75
Given the high correlation, record giving following the 9/11 terror
attacks, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, and Hurricanes Katrina, Rita,
and Wilma, may not be surprising, as each disaster received extensive
24/7 media coverage.

76

67. See Fleischer, supra note 65, at 16-19.
68. Pozen, supra note 57, at 594-96.
69. JOULFAIAN, supra note 24, at 1.
70. Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the CharitableContribution Deduction, 42
B.C. L. REV. 843, 850-52 (2001).

71. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (2000). Lower limits apply to certain contributions to
private foundations and contributions of capital gain property. Id. § 170(b)(1)(B)-(C).
72. Id. § 170(d)(1). It has been argued that the common rationales for the limitation
on the charitable deduction do not make sense when viewed in connection with the
availability of an unlimited carry forward. Fleischer, supra note 65, at 51-52.
73. I.R.C. § 170(b)(2) (West Supp. 2007). Excess contributions can be carried
forward for up to five years. Id. § 170(d)(2).
74. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
75. Brown & Minty, supra note 44, at 3-4; see also Bennett & Kottasz, supra note 6, at
354.
76. Charitable Giving in U.S. Nears Record Set at End of Tech Boom,
USATODAY.CoM, June 19, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-06-19-

charitable-givingx.htm ("The urgent needs created by three major natural disasters-the
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Because charitable organizations are generally governed by the
standards established in common law for trusts, charitable organizations
are obligated to respect and follow the wishes of the donor.77
Contributions made to aid the victims of a specific disaster may pose a
number of problems to the charity and to society. First, donations
directed to benefit the victims of a mega disaster may leave less aid
available to victims of less well publicized and smaller disasters. 8 Such
contributions also leave the DRO less discretion as to how to deploy the
resources at its disposal. Second, as a result of frequent pleas for
assistance, donors may be less willing to contribute to aid efforts, which
Philanthropy
may reduce the amount of victim aid available.79
professionals often worry that frequent pleas for assistance will make
donors less likely to contribute to disaster relief efforts." This is
sometimes referred to as "donor fatigue."'" Third, it may be difficult for
newly-formed DROs to fulfill their charitable purposes because they are
less well-known.8 ' Finally, if donors contribute more aid to victims of a
particular disaster than can be used for the reasonable needs of the
disaster victims, charitable organizations face the difficult task of
tsunami in Asia, earthquake in Pakistan, and hurricanes Rita, Katrina and Wilma -drove
American philanthropy to its highest level since the end of the technology boom .... ");
Thomas Frank, Katrina Inspires Record Charity, USA TODAY, Nov. 14, 2005, at 1A
(describing charitable giving after Hurricane Katrina as "the biggest charitable outpouring
in U.S. history"); Stephanie Strom, Faith in Charities Still Below Pre-9/11 Level, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 27, 2003, at A28 (stating that the 9/11 attacks "inspired record charitable
giving").
77. Curtis W. Meadows Jr., Director, RGK Ctr. for Philanthropy and Cmty. Serv.,
Waldemar A. Nielsen Issues in Philanthropy Seminar Series: Philanthropic Choice and
Donor Intent: Freedom, Responsibility and Public Interest 4 (Nov. 22, 2002), available at
See generally GEORGE
http://cpnl.georgetown.edu/doc-poolUNielsen0205Meadows.pdf.
GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

§ 361 (rev. 2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 2006).
78. See Somini Sengupta & David Rohde, When One Tragedy Gets More Sympathy
Than Another, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2005, at F30 ("'There should be predictability in the
right to getting life-saving relief .... It should not be a lottery."').
79. See Colum Lynch, Donations Slowing as Disasters Mount Worldwide, WASH.
POST, Oct. 16, 2005, at A23 ("Two major disasters during the past year-Hurricane
Katrina and the Indian Ocean tsunami- have sapped funding for other causes .... ").
80. See id.; Corinne Purtill, Charities Fear "Donor Fatigue", ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct.
12, 2005, at 1. But see Stephanie Strom, Many Dismissing 'DonorFatigue' As Myth, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 2006, at A22.
81. See Lynch, supra note 79; Purtill, supra note 80. However, there is some evidence
that donor fatigue is less likely to occur with respect to disaster relief than other charitable
appeals. Bennett & Kottasz, supra note 6, at 353.
82. See Bennett & Kottasz, supra note 6, at 356 tbl. 1, 358 (listing major fundraising
triggers, one of which is whether "the charity making the appeal is a well-known charity,"
and suggesting that a combined appeal for disaster relief will be most successful if
"'fronted' by the most well-known and 'non-political"' charities).
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simultaneously fulfilling their missions, using the funds in accordance
with donors' wishes, maintaining their tax-exempt status, and avoiding
the negative
publicity associated with redeploying aid to other worthy
83
causes.
The problems faced by charitable organizations that have
received more contributions for a specific disaster than can be used for
permissible relief of the needs of victims include: the risk that
distributions will violate the donor's wishes, that the organization's taxexempt status will be put in jeopardy, and that negative publicity will
follow an organization's decision regarding the use of "excess"
contributions. 84
Not all disaster relief comes from DROs or governmental relief
agencies. Certain additional relief is available to victims of Presidentially
declared disasters through the Code. Victims of these disasters may
have greater opportunities to deduct casualty losses," obtain replacement
property without gain or loss recognition,
or receive certain aid
payments without recognizing income. 8 In addition, despite the historic
lack of legislative relief during disasters, the Department of Treasury is
able to afford some relief in the form of extensions of time to file and
perform other tasks, as well as delays in collections and other processes. 89

83. See Robert A. Katz, A Pig in a Python: How the Charitable Response to
September 11 Overwhelmed the Law of DisasterRelief, 36 IND. L. REV. 251, 272-84, 286-92
(2003) (discussing the consequences, tensions, and options for the use of surplus charitable
contributions).
84. See infra Part IV.A. This was the case with respect to the American Red Cross in
the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks. See Barstow, supra note 21. Even after closing the
Liberty Fund, the American Red Cross received more donations than could be distributed
under the traditional charitable guidelines. See id. The Red Cross decided to divert some
of the funds to other areas with greater need, and a huge outcry resulted. See id. This left
the Red Cross in the unenviable position of trying to appease the victims, the donors, and
the media to accomplish both its mission in the short term (to provide aid to the terror
attack victims) and in the long term (to ensure that donors would continue to contribute
and provide aid in future events). See id.
85. I.R.C. § 165(h)-(i) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (relating to casualty losses and disaster
losses); id. § 1033(h) (addressing the purchase of a replacement property for certain
involuntary conversions caused by property destruction during a Presidentially declared
disaster); I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(F)(ii)(III) (West Supp. 2007) (relating to net operating
losses).
86. I.R.C. § 165(i).
87. Id. § 1033(h).
88. I.R.C. § 139 (Supp. V 2005).
89. Tolan, supra note 25, at 811-12; see also I.R.C. § 7508A (2000) (showing that the
Internal Revenue Code provides the Department of Treasury some discretion to adjust
deadlines for disaster victims).
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2. Disaster Relief Payments from CharitableOrganizations
State law generally controls the day-to-day operations of charitable
organizations. 90 Nonetheless, federal tax law plays a significant role in
funding charitable organizations by limiting federal income tax
contribution deductions, which encourage charitable giving, to
contributions to certain tax-exempt entities. 9' To determine whether an
organization is a charitable organization, and whether contributions are
entitled to a charitable deduction, the tax law has generally followed the
common law of trusts. 92 Therefore, to successfully permit donors to
make tax deductible contributions, charitable organizations must be
cognizant of both state laws regarding their operation and federal tax
laws regarding their classification as a tax-exempt organization under
Code section 501(c)(3). 93

Disaster relief payments that are made to help a victim pay for
immediate needs like food, housing, and clothing have long been
excluded from income. 94 However, before 2002, such treatment was not
included in the Code,95 leaving the Service to determine the appropriate
treatment of such payments. 96
Distributions made by charitable
organizations to disaster victims were considered gifts because they were
made with "'detached and disinterested generosity,"' and were therefore
excluded from the income of the recipient. 7 The Service viewed a
charitable organization's "gifts" to a disaster victim as including medical
expenses, temporary housing costs, transportation, and similar
expenses.
Because transfers from a charity to a victim to pay for
expenses of this type generally satisfy the requirement of detached and

90. See generally EDITH L. FISCH, DORIS JONAS FREED & ESTHER R. SCHACHTER,

§§ 684-94 (1974) (discussing the regulation
and supervision of charitable organizations by the different states); EDWIN S. NEWMAN,
LAW OF PHILANTHROPY 23-26, 28-47 (1955) (discussing state regulation of charitable
organizations); see also BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 77, § 361.
91. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (2000); see also supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
92. See generally BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 77, § 361.
93. See generally I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (listing the requirements an organization
must meet to be considered tax-exempt).
94. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-1 C.B. 283 (applying newly enacted section 139
of the Internal Revenue Code to hypothetical disaster scenarios); Rev. Rul. 76-144, 1976-1
C.B. 17 (applying the exclusion to payments made under the Disaster Relief Act of 1974);
Rev. Rul. 53-131, 1953-2 C.B. 112 (concluding employer aid to employees following a
tornado was not gross income for the recipients).
95. See I.R.C. § 139 (Supp. V 2005) (enacted in 2002).
96. See generally id.
97. See I.R.C. § 102 (2000); Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960).
98. Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-1 C.B. 283 (situation 2).
CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS
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disinterested generosity, the receipt of the payment is usually nontaxable
to the victim. 99
Prior to the enactment of Code section 139 in 2002, some payments
frequently made to disaster victims, such as payments from an employer
to a victim-employee, were not as easily excluded from the victim's
income because they did not easily fit within the definition of a gift. 00 To
exclude payments from an employer to an employee, a different
rationale is needed because such payments are seldom made out of a
disinterested spirit of generosity. 1 Nonetheless, in early rulings, the
Service concluded that disaster assistance payments made to help
employees meet basic needs like obtaining food and shelter following a
disaster should not be included in the employee's income, even though
the payments did not qualify as gifts.102
Similarly, employer
reimbursement of medical, temporary housing, and transportation
expenses, which were not otherwise covered by insurance, could be
excluded from the employee's income.03 This treatment was first
permitted by the Service in a 1953 revenue ruling considering victim
assistance payments from an employer to an employee following a
tornado. °4 Similarly, a 1976 revenue ruling excluded government grants
of aid disaster to victims following a flood from the recipient's gross
income."'
The exclusion of government- and employer-provided disaster relief in6
certain cases has now been codified in section 139 of the Code.'
However, to be excluded from income, such expenses must be
reasonable and necessary and the employee must provide documentation
of the expenses.t0

The nature and extent of the disaster also play a role in determining
the tax consequences of disaster relief payments. The tax consequences
of aid to disaster victims depends in part on whether the aid was received
as a result of a Presidentially declared disaster.' 8 A Presidentially
99. Id.
100. Duberstein,363 U.S. at 285. See generally I.R.C. § 139.
101. Cf. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285 (noting that payments made in anticipation of
economic benefit or for services rendered cannot be considered gifts).
102. Rev. Rul. 53-131, 1953-2 C.B. 112 (concluding than an employer's aid to
employees following a tornado was not gross income for the recipients because the aid was
"not related to services rendered, but. .. based solely on need").
103.

Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-1 C.B. 283 (situation 3).

104. Rev. Rul. 53-131, 1953-2 C.B. 112.
105. Rev. Rul. 76-144, 1976-1 C.B. 17 (applying the exclusion to payments made under
the Disaster Relief Act of 1974).
106. See I.R.C. § 139 (Supp. V 2005).
107. See Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-1 C.B. 283 (situation 3).
108. See I.R.C. § 139(c); I.R.C. §§ 165(i), 1033(h) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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declared disaster is "any disaster which, with respect to the area in which
the property is located, resulted in a subsequent determination by the
President that such area warrants assistance by the Federal Government
under1°the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act.,, 9
Qualified disaster relief payments to victims of a Presidentially
declared disaster are excluded from income." Qualified disaster relief
payments are payments that are not otherwise compensated and that are
paid for one of the following reasons:
(1) to reimburse or pay reasonable and necessary personal,
family, living, or funeral expenses incurred as a result of a
qualified disaster,
(2) to reimburse or pay reasonable and necessary expenses
incurred for the repair or rehabilitation of a personal residence
or repair or replacement of its contents to the extent that the
need for such repair, rehabilitation, or replacement is
attributable to a qualified disaster,
(3) by a person engaged in the furnishing or sale of
transportation as a common carrier by reason of the death or
personal physical injuries incurred as a result of a qualified
disaster, or
(4) if such amount is paid by a Federal, State, or local
government, or agency or instrumentality thereof, in connection
with a c ualified disaster in order to promote the general
welfare.
A qualified disaster is one that fits one of the following categories:
(1) a disaster which results from a terroristic or military
action (as defined in section 692(c)(2)),
(2) a Presidentially declared disaster (as defined in section

1033(h)(3)),
(3) a disaster which results from an accident involving a
common carrier, or from any other event, which is determined
by the Secretary to be of a catastrophic nature, or
(4) with respect to amounts described in subsection (b)(4), a
disaster which is determined by an applicable Federal, State, or
local authority (as determined by the Secretary) to warrant

109. I.R.C. § 1033(h)(3) (Supp. V. 2005).
110. I.R.C. § 139(a)-(c). These payments are also excludable if certain other
governmental authorities determine that the payments are needed for the general welfare
of the recipient. Id.
111. Id. § 139(b).
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assistance from the Federal, State, or local government or
agency or instrumentality thereof."'
Qualified disaster relief payments from the government and DROs are
not the only aspects of a disaster that have tax consequences. First, some
payments to victims of a disaster may not meet the requirements for
qualified disaster relief payments, either because of the nature of the
payment or the nature of the disaster."' Nonetheless, some tax relief is
possible for disaster victims who receive payments other than qualified
disaster relief payments. Earlier IRS revenue rulings established a
number of circumstances under which gross income did not include
payments made to victims of natural disasters to assist them in obtaining
food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and other basic needs.14
Insurance payments may also be excluded from income."' Insurance
payments may be qualified disaster relief payments 116 if they are made to
cover living expenses incurred as a result of the loss of use of a principal
residence in a Presidentially declared disaster area.1 7 Alternatively, loss
of use may result from a fire or storm that may not be large enough to
warrant making the area a Presidentially declared disaster area.118
However, even without that declaration, insurance payments may not be
included in income. To the extent that insurance pays for the repair or
replacement of insured property, the payments are made to restore the
taxpayer to his prior position and if used for repairs are not included in
income, but reduce the amount of loss that can be deducted. 119
At least two other types of tax relief may also be available for disaster
victims who suffer losses. First, upon the sale of a principal residence
that the taxpayer has owned and in which he has been living for at least
two of the previous five years, the taxpayer can exclude from income up
to a $250,000 gain ($500,000 for married couples filing jointly).12 ° If the
taxpayer does not meet the two year use test, the taxpayer can still claim
the exclusion if there is an unexpected loss as a result of a natural or

112. Id. § 139(c).
113. See id. § 139(b)-(c) (listing the requirements of qualified payments and qualified
disasters).
114. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 76-144, 1976-1 C.B. 17 (applying the exclusion to payments
made under the Disaster Relief Act of 1974); Rev. Rul. 53-131, 1953-2 C.B. 112
(concluding that employer aid to employees following a tornado was not gross income for
the recipients).
115. I.R.C. § 123(a) (2000).
116. See generally I.R.C. § 139.
117. I.R.C. § 123(a).
118. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 1033(h)(3) (Supp. V 2005).
119. See I.R.C. § 165(a), (h)-(i).
120. Id. § 121.
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man-made disaster. 121 This may help taxpayers whose principal residence
is destroyed and who are unable to or choose not to rebuild, but have
insurance coverage exceeding their basis.
Second, when a taxpayer's property is involuntarily converted or
destroyed, as when it is destroyed in an earthquake, fire, or a storm, the
taxpayer may exclude any gain realized. 122 For any gain to be excluded
from income, the taxpayer must use any money received as a result of the
conversion, destruction, theft, seizure, requisition, or condemnation of
the property to obtain replacement property. 23 Nonrecognition has two
components: first, payment must be compensation for the property;
second, the property must be replaced with similar property within two
years of the loss. 124 The two year replacement period may be extended
following certain disasters.
Additional time for replacement may be
important, particularly following a large scale disaster like Hurricane
Katrina, because of the degree to which victims' lives are disrupted.
Following disasters with massive property destruction, victims may have
significant difficulty even locating suitable replacement property. Even
with property destroyed during a disaster that is not a Presidentially
declared disaster, a taxpayer who is unable to replace the destroyed
property within two years can request an extension of time from the
Secretary.1 26
The following sections will discuss the changes Congress made to the
tax treatment of disaster victims and, in some cases, charitable donors
following some of the worst recent disasters. These changes were
contrary to the treatment established following earlier disasters, which
left the charitable landscape largely unchanged but permitted some relief
to victims.
B. Tax Consequences of Payments to Victims of the 9/11 TerrorAttacks
The 9/11 terror attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,
along with the crash of Flight 93 in Pennsylvania, led to unprecedented
charitable contributions. More
than $2 billion was contributed to aid the
12
victims and their survivors. 1
The victims experienced massive need. Approximately 3,000 people
were killed and upwards of 100,000 lost their income in New York City
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Treas. Reg. § 1.121-3(e)(2) (2007).
I.R.C. § 1033(a) (2000).
Id.
Id. § 1033(a)(2)(B).
See id. § 1033(h)(1)(B).
Id. § 1033(a)(2)(B)(ii).
Michael Burnstein, Charitiesand DisasterRelief for September 11 and Beyond, 13

TAX'N OF EXEMPTs 283, 284 (2002).
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alone following the terror attacks.
Residents of 12the
area surrounding
9
ground zero were left at least temporarily homeless.
These attacks were followed in the fall of 2001 by the delivery of
several letters containing anthrax spores.3' The anthrax attacks were
much less extensive, sickening twenty-two people and killing five. 1 '
However, the anthrax attacks disrupted postal operations at several
facilities, interfered with government mail delivery, and also increased
the national anxiety regarding the safety of citizens and visitors to the
United States, making these attacks a serious threat.
Some victim relief funds dedicated to aiding the victims of one or both
of these events received more contributions than they could distribute
under the traditional guidelines for distribution of disaster aid by
charitable organizations. The traditional guidelines stated that disaster
relief "[could not] be distributed to individuals merely because they are
victims of a disaster.', 3 2 Under the traditional guidelines, aid had to be
distributed based on objective criteria that reflected the recipients'
needs.'33

As a result, both well-established charities and newly formed DROs
were placed in a very difficult position because they had received
restricted contributions that could not be distributed to 9/11 survivors
and their families based on the traditional guidelines. Should the
organizations follow the wishes of the donors and potentially risk their
tax-exempt status, or should they shift the aid to other disasters?
Donations in many cases exceeded the reasonable objective needs of the
victims or subclass of victims and survivors whom donors intended to
benefit. This left many DROs who received excess contributions with
the quandary of whether to return funds to the donors, risk their taxexempt status by continuing to make distributions to intended
beneficiaries beyond their objective needs, or redirect the funds to other
causes and risk public furor.' 4 Even returning the funds to the donors
presented problems, as many contributions were made anonymously and
the donors could not be identified.
128.
129.

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 1.
Michael Powell & Christine Haughney, A Towering Task Lags in New York,

WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2002, at A3.
130. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-152, BIOTERRORISM: PUBLIC
HEALTH RESPONSE TO ANTHRAX INCIDENTS OF 2001, 1 (2003).
131. Id.
132. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUBL'N 3833,
DISASTER RELIEF: PROVIDING ASSISTANCE THROUGH CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
7 (rev. 2005), available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3833.pdf; see also Katz, supra note 83,
at 272-73.

133. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 06-10, 2006-5 I.R.B. 386.
134. See Katz, supra note 83, at 253-54.
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When the American Red Cross announced that it would divert some
of the aid it received for 9/11 survivors, a huge public outcry against this
plan resulted.'35 In light of the strong public sentiment, it is fortunate for
the disaster relief organizations that Congress ultimately acted to permit
charities to use the money for the purposes for which it was donated, in
most cases.'36

In January 2002, Congress passed and President Bush

signed the Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, which relaxed
As
the traditional standards for the distribution of aid by charities.'
long as distributions were made to victims of the 9/11 terror attacks or
anthrax attacks occurring before January 1, 2002, were made in good
faith, were reasonable, and were made according to objective standards,
the distributions would not place the organization's tax-exempt status in
jeopardy. '3 This legislation helped relieve the pressure on both Congress
and the relief organizations that were trying to help victims and their
survivors.
Unfortunately, even though it addressed the immediate concerns that
DROs faced regarding their tax-exempt status and public relations, the
2002 legislation did not address all of the problems. First, contributions
to the 9/11 terror attack and anthrax attack victims meant there may
have been less aid available to victims of other disasters. Second, the
legislation addressed the problem only with respect to these specific
relief efforts, not with respect to other relief efforts, meaning DROs
attending to victims of future disasters could face similar problems.
C. CharitableContributionsfor 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami Relief
The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami occurred on December 26, 2004."'
This massive tsunami left hundreds of thousands dead and over a million
people displaced. 40 The response to this disaster was unprecedented.
Worldwide, private contributions to help the tsunami victims totaled

135.

See, e.g., Barstow, supra note 21; Stephanie Strom, New Equation for Charities:

More Money, Less Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,2003, at F1.

136.

See Katz, supra note 83, at 290-92.

137. Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act, Pub. L. 107-134, 115 Stat. 2427 (2002).
138. Id. § 104(a), 115 Stat. at 2431.
139. Brown & Minty, supra note 44, at 3.
140. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-488, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE:
USAID HAS BEGUN TSUNAMI RECONSTRUCTION IN INDONESIA AND SRI LANKA, BUT
KEY PROJECTS MAY EXCEED INITIAL COST AND SCHEDULE ESTIMATES 1 (2006). More
than 230,000 people were killed by the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Id. In addition, over
1.7 million people were displaced. Id.
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more than $5 billion. 141 Governments worldwide also contributed billions
of dollars of aid to the relief effort142
To permit and encourage United States taxpayers to help those
affected by the tsunami, Congress passed a temporary change to the
charitable giving rules. 143 The legislation to permit tax relief to charitable
contributors made its way through Congress and into law with
unprecedented speed. Under this legislation, contributions for tsunami
relief made after December 31, 2004, and on or before January 31, 2005,
could be deducted as though they were made on December 31, 2004.'"
The new law gave taxpayers a choice between reporting the deduction
for charitable contributions to domestic charities for tsunami relief either
during 2004, thereby accelerating the deduction, or 2005, when the
contribution was made.
The adjustment to the charitable contribution deduction was very
limited. Only cash contributions made for tsunami relief to domestic
charitable organizations were eligible for the acceleration into 2004.'4 In
addition, contributions had to be made by January 31, 2005.14' Finally,
single contributions could not be treated as partially made in 2004 and
partially made in 2005, but separate contributions could be classified
individually. 14 The deduction acceleration permitted some taxpayers to
engage in limited post-tax year tax planning, which taxpayers ordinarily
cannot do with charitable contributions.
D. CharitableGiving and DisasterRelief Following
HurricanesKatrina,Rita, and Wilma
Hurricane Katrina, which made landfall on August 29, 2005, "caused
more damage than any other single natural disaster in the history of the
United States.' ' 149 Many were killed and hundreds of thousands of people
were displaced when their homes and businesses were damaged or

141.
142.

INT'L FED'N OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT Soc'Ys, supra note

1, at 8, 168.

The Tsunami Report Card: Indicators, FOREIGN POL'Y, Dec. 2005, http://www.

foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story-id=3273.
143. Act of Jan. 7, 2005, Pub. L. 109-1, 119 Stat. 3; see also Brown & Minty, supra note
44, at 5-6.
144. Act of Jan. 7, 2005, § 1, 119 Stat. at 3.
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., New Law Encourages Tsunami Relief
Contributions (Jan. 10, 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=
133843,00.html ("The new law gives taxpayers the option of deducting the contributions
on either their 2004 or 2005 returns, but not both.").
149. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, at 6.
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destroyed."'o
Property damage from the hurricane exceeded $96
billion.5 ' Following Hurricane Katrina, the National Response Plan
(NRP) was put into action. 52 The NRP, recognizing the need to use both
government and private resources in the event of a major incident, was
established after the 9/11 terror attacks, and called for cooperation
between government agencies (i.e. FEMA) and private relief
organizations (the American Red Cross and others).'53 The NRP
is designed to address the response to both natural and man-made
disasters.'-

Hurricane Katrina was devastating. However, unfortunately for
residents of Louisiana and Mississippi, Hurricane Katrina was not all
nature had to offer. Shortly after Hurricane Katrina, Hurricanes Rita
and Wilma struck, increasing the damage and suffering.
These
hurricanes, which overlapped the area hit by Hurricane Katrina, killed
and displaced even more people, and further property was damaged and
destroyed. All told, the three hurricanes killed over 1200 people and
caused massive property damage in a tri-state area.155 The result of all
three hurricanes was an unprecedented need for both government and
private aid.
The amount of need overwhelmed many agencies. FEMA determined
that almost 950,000 applicants were eligible for housing assistance

150. METRO. POLICY PROGRAM, THE BROOKINGS INST., NEW ORLEANS AFTER THE
STORM: LESSONS FROM THE PAST, A PLAN FOR THE FUTURE 13-14 (2005), available at

http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/reports/2005/ 0metropolitanpolicy-fixauthorna
me/20051012_NewOrleans.pdf.
151.

U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, at 6.

152. Id. at 8-9 ("The National Response Plan is designed on the premise that disaster
response is generally handled by local jurisdictions .... Local jurisdictions can also call on
state resources to provide additional assistance. If an incident is of such severity that it is
deemed an incident of national significance, DHS and FEMA coordinate with other
federal agencies to provide the affected state and local governments with additional
resources and supplemental assistance.").
153. Id. at 9.
154. See id. at 1 (noting that the NRP is designed to respond to "incidents of national
significance, such as natural disasters and terrorist attacks").
155. See METRO. POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 150, at 13 ("[Hurricane Katrina's]
death toll stands around 1,200 people in the multi-state affected area, with about 1,000 of

the dead having resided in Louisiana.");

RICHARD D. KNABB, DANIEL P. BROWN &
JAMIE R. RHOME, NAT'L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE

RITA

8

(2006),

available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL182005_Rita.pdf;

("Seven fatalities have been directly attributed to the forces of Rita ....
At least 55
'indirect' fatalities have [also] been reported .... "); RICHARD J. PASCH, ERIC S. BLAKE,
HUGH D. COBB III & DAVID P. ROBERTS, NAT'L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL
CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE WILMA 5 (2006) ("Twenty-three deaths have been
directly attributed to Wilma.
), available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCRAL252005_Wilma.pdf.
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following Hurricane Katrina alone. 56 The American Red Cross stated
that it assisted more than 1.4 million families following Hurricanes
Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.
In May 2007, more than twenty months
after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, over 30,000 families who were
displaced by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita remained spread across the
country and were still receiving housing aid from FEMA; 13,000 families
remained in FEMA trailers.'
In the wake of the 2005 record-setting hurricane season, Congress
enacted several tax incentives for individuals and corporations to engage
in charitable giving, and also provided tax relief for victims of Hurricanes
Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. 9 The temporary nature of the relief may not
be sufficient to address the long-term needs of these victims.
The following sections discuss the temporary incentives Congress
created for charitable giving. These sections also discuss the temporary
tax relief provided to the victims of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.
1. Tax Incentives for CharitableGiving
The Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 ("KETRA") amended
the Code to temporarily increase
the charitable deduction available to
.. 160
individuals and corporations.. 0 The
deduction
limits under KETRA
•
161

differed for individuals and corporations.
Individuals could deduct qualified contributions made between August
28, 2005 and December 31, 2005 equal to as much as one hundred
percent of their adjusted gross income. 62 Qualified contributions had to
156. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Frequently Requested National
Statistics Hurricane Katrina-One Year Later, http://www.fema.gov/hazard/hurricane/
2005katrinalanniversaryjactsheet.shtm (last visited Feb. 7, 2008).
157. AMERICAN RED CROSS, A YEAR OF HEALING: THE AMERICAN RED CROSS
RESPONSE TO HURRICANES KATRINA, RITA AND WILMA 2 (2006), available at

http://www.redcross.org/images/pdfs/KatrinaOneYearReport.pdf.
158. Shaila Dewan, Road to New Life After Katrina Is Closed to Many, N.Y. TIMES,
July 12, 2007, at Al. In February 2008, many families displaced by Katrina remained in
FEMA trailers. FEMA agreed to move all families out of the trailers no later than June 1,
2008 because of higher than normal indoor formaldehyde levels found during a study
conducted by the Centers for Disease Control. Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control
and Prevention & Fed. Emergency Mgmt Agency, CDC Releases Results of
Formaldehyde Level Tests, (Feb. 14, 2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/
media/pressrel/2008/r080214b.htm.
159. See, e.g., Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act (KETRA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 10973, 119 Stat. 2016; Gulf Opportunity Zone Act (GO Zone Act) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109135, 119 Stat. 2577.
160. KETRA §§ 301-06.
161. See id. § 301.
162. Id. § 301(b)(1)(A) ("Any qualified contribution shall be allowed only to the
extent that the aggregate of such contributions does not exceed the excess of the
taxpayer's contribution base . . . over the amount of all other charitable contributions
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be cash,' 6' and could not be made to establish or maintain a segregated
fund or account over which the donor (or his designee) had, or was
reasonably expected to have, advisory prtvtleges.
KETRA also increased
•- . 165 the deduction available to corporations for
charitable contributions.
KETRA permitted corporations a deduction
for cash charitable contributions of up to the amount of the corporation's
taxable income.' 66 To receive the increased charitable deduction under
KETRA, corporate contributions had to be made for relief efforts
related to Hurricane Katrina. The expanded AGI limit was extended
by the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 (GO Zone Act) to include
contributions for relief efforts related to Hurricanes Rita and Wilma.'
Increased charitable deductions were not the only incentives Congress
provided to encourage aid to the hurricane victims. Other more targeted
tax incentives were included in KETRA and expanded by the GO Zone
Act to encourage the provision of assistance to victims. First, a $500
exemption from income was provided for individuals who provided
housing to a person displaced by one of the hurricanes. 6 1 Second, the
standard mileage rate for deduction or reimbursement of mileage for the
use of a vehicle for charitable purposes was increased. 70 There were also
additional incentives for the contribution of food inventories, and book
inventories to public schools.' 7 ' These additional incentives were
designed to get aid directly to the victims.
2. Tax Relieffor Victims of HurricanesKatrina,Rita, and Wilma
Along with the tax incentives to encourage individuals and
corporations to give aid to victims, KETRA and the GO Zone Act
provided some additional tax relief to the victims of Hurricanes Katrina,
Rita, and Wilma. The relief available to victims of these hurricanes is
described below.
.."). "[T]he
.
term 'contribution base' means adjusted gross income (computed without
regard to any net operating loss carryback to the taxable year . . . )." I.R.C. §
170(b)(1)(G) (West Supp. 2007) (note that at the time KETRA was passed, this definition
was codified at I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(F) (2000)).
163. KETRA § 301(d)(1)(A).

164. Id.§ 301(d)(2).
165. Id. § 301(b)(2).
166. Id. § 301(b)(2)(A).
167. Id. § 301(d)(1)(B).
168. Gulf Opportunity Zone Act (GO Zone Act) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-135, § 201,
119 Stat. 2577, 2596 (codified at I.R.C. § 1400S (Supp. V 2005)).
169. KETRA § 302(a). The exemption, available in 2005 and 2006, was capped at
$2,000 per taxpayer providing housing. Id. § 302(b).
170. Id. §§ 303-04.
171. Id. §§ 305-06.
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First, the areas affected by the hurricanes were Presidentially declared
That designation entitles victims to certain
disaster areas."
•
171 basic
statutory relief. It allows victims to deduct casualty losses, obtain
replacement property without gain or loss recognition, 74 and receive
certain aid payments without recognizing income. "5
In addition, KETRA permitted a victim of the hurricanes to exclude
certain discharges of indebtedness from an individual's gross income. 76
The legislation excludes certain discharges of indebtedness occurring
before January 1, 2007.177 However, if the indebtedness was incurred in
connection with a trade or business, or related to real property located
outside the core disaster area, a discharge of indebtedness was not
eligible for exclusion from income under KETRA. 17 Individuals could
not receive benefits from both KETRA and section 108(a) of the Code. 79
Second, the limitations on personal casualty losses were suspended for
losses on property in the disaster areas 8 ° Ordinarily, taxpayers can only
deduct casualty losses exceeding ten percent of their adjusted gross
income and in excess of $100.181 Under KETRA and the GO Zone Act,
these limitations do not apply to losses attributable to the hurricanes or
any other personal casualty losses. 82 In addition, a taxpayer can elect to
accelerate the loss deduction to the year preceding the disaster for loss
attributable to any disaster in a Presidentially declared disaster area.183
Third, taxpayers in the affected areas were permitted to make
withdrawals of up to $100,000 from qualified retirement accounts,
including IRAs, without paying the ordinary penalties.
Although no
penalties were imposed on these withdrawals, ordinary income taxes had
to be paid; but KETRA permitted taxpayers to spread the income, and
therefore the taxes, over three years.
Taxpayers who made such
withdrawals were also permitted to repay the withdrawals within three
years, thereby avoiding payment of the taxes altogether.'8 6 In addition,
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. § 2; GO Zone Act § 101, I.R.C. § 1400M (Supp. V 2005).
I.R.C. § 165(h)-(i) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
Id. § 1033(h).
I.R.C. § 139 (Supp. V 2005).
KETRA § 401(a).
Id.§ 401(e).

178.

Id. § 401(c).

179.
180.

Id.§ 401(d).
Id. § 402.

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

I.R.C. § 165(h) (2000).
KETRA § 402; GO Zone Act § 201, I.R.C. § 1400S(b) (West Supp. 2007).
I.R.C. § 165(i) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
KETRA § 101; GO Zone Act § 201, I.R.C. § 1400Q(a) (Supp. V 2005).
KETRA § 101(e).
Id.§ 101(c).
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taxpayers who had previously made withdrawals to help pay for the
purchase of a home were permitted to repay the distributions without
penalty, if the hurricanes resulted in the cancellation of the purchase.'7
Fourth, taxpayers in the affected areas were also permitted to take
larger loans against their qualified retirement accounts.'
The usual
$50,000 limit for loans from a qualified retirement plan was increased to
$100,000 for victims of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.' 89 In
addition, the time for repayment of such loans was extended.' 90
III. JUSTIFICATIONS OF DEDUCTION FOR CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS
A. Explanationsfor Donor Behaviorin Making CharitableContributions
It is difficult to determine precisely why donors give to charity. It is
clear that different donors to a single cause may have different
motivations, and that a single donor may have different motivations
depending on the cause. Some reasons are intrinsic and depend on how
giving makes the donor feel. Survey responses indicate that charitable
contributions are driven by feelings of approval or obligation, group
membership, individual benefit, and peer pressure.'91
However,
economic considerations are also important to the decision to give
money to a charitable cause. The availability of a tax deduction or credit
for charitable contributions will increase the likelihood that individuals
and corporations will make contributions. 2

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. § 102.
Id. § 103.
Id. § 103(a)(1).
Id. § 103(b).
Gergen, supra note 23, at 1430.
See Michael J. Boskin & Martin Feldstein, Effects of the Charitable Deduction on

Contributionsby Low Income and Middle Income Households: Evidence from the National
Survey of Philanthropy, 59 REV. ECON. & STAT. 351, 354 (1977) ("Tax incentives to

encourage giving by low and middle income households would induce a substantial
increase in the flow of funds to charitable organizations."); Martin Feldstein & Amy
Taylor, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions, 44 ECONOMETRICA 1201, 1217,

1221 (1976) ("[T]he current deductibility of charitable gifts is a very efficient incentive,
yielding more in additional gifts than the Treasury forgoes in potential additional
revenue."); see also Harold M. Hochman & James D. Rodgers, The Optimal Tax
Treatment of CharitableContributions,30 NAT'L. TAX J. 1, 13-15 (1977) (recommending a

tax credit in lieu of deductibility for charitable contributions); Joel Slemrod, Are Estimated
Tax ElasticitiesReally Just Tax Evasion Elasticities? The Case of CharitableContributions,

71 REV. ECON. & STAT. 517, 522 (1989) (analyzing the tax responsiveness of charitable
giving in relation to misreporting, and concluding that "the responsiveness of actual giving
is higher than is suggested by studying reported contributions").
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B. Selected Justificationsfor the CharitableDeduction
When the deduction for charitable contributions was first permitted in
1917, the reason appears to have been "to ensure that the income tax
would not suppress giving to charity., 19 3 Over time, additional
justifications based on both economic and social philosophy theories
have been put forward 194to support the continued tax subsidization of
charitable contributions.
A determination regarding whether and to what extent a deduction or
other tax benefit should be implemented should involve a consideration
of not only the impact on the tax system, but also overall tax policy.
Among the most frequently asserted goals of tax policy are equity,
efficiency, and ability-to-pay.'9 5 Each of these goals can be defined in
more than one way and may be in tension with the other goals."'
However, in the abstract, most agree that these are important goals to be
achieved by the tax system, though many would include other goals as
well. 19
One commonly used definition of efficiency is the Pareto optimality
theory, under which, as a result of a change in the system, at least one
person's position is improved and no person's position is worsened. 198 It
has been argued that a deduction for charitable contributions cannot
result in Pareto improvements, because some will either not want to
support charity or will not want to support charity to the extent that they
bear the burden of the tax subsidy. 99
Another approach to determining efficiency is the Kaldor-Hicks
model, which considers a policy to be efficient if the societal gains
resulting from a change more than offset the societal losses from the
change and no further improvement can be obtained by making

193. Gergen, supra note 23, at 1396.
194. See id. at 1396-97.
195. See, e.g., William Blatt, The American Dream in Legislation: The Role of Popular
Symbols in Wealth Tax Policy, 51 TAX. L. REV. 287, 299-303 (1996) (analyzing tax policy,
and discussing equity, efficiency, and ability-to-pay as common tax policy goals).
196. See id. at 301 ("[Tax policy] goals have their shortcomings. For one, they often
conflict. Equity often clashes with benefit and efficiency ....The conflict and imprecision
of tax policy norms lead[s] to considerable disagreement.").
197. See, e.g., id. at 299-303; Leandra Lederman, "Stranger than Fiction": Taxing
Virtual Worlds, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1620, 1658 (2007) ("The tax policy concerns usually
considered in evaluating the appropriateness of a tax or provision are equity, efficiency,
and administrability.").
198. Jules C. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 509, 515, 517 (1980) ("Allocations that are Pareto superior increase at least one
person's utility without adversely affecting the utility of another; they produce winners but
no losers.").
199. Gergen, supra note 23, at 1412.
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A policy can be a Kaldor-Hicks
additional changes in policy."
improvement if the policy achieves better results than would occur
without the policy, but does not reach Kaldor-Hicks efficiency because
additional improvements are possible.0
Because the charitable deduction creates a disparity of treatment
between donors based on whether they itemize, some have argued that
the charitable deduction should not be limited to itemizers. 202 In
addition, because the benefits of a deduction depend on the taxpayer's
marginal tax rate, high income taxpayers receive a greater benefit than
lower income taxpayers, violating the principle of vertical equity. 23
Moreover, inequity is created among donors when different rules apply
to contributions to aid different disasters. Differential treatment may
also create inequities for the victims both in aid available and in tax
consequences to the victims. Eliminating the disparity of the treatment
of contributions by eliminating the requirement that taxpayers itemize
deductions could create a Kaldor-Hicks improvement. 204
On the other hand, providing a tax credit for a charitable contribution
may not be an improvement under either of these theories because
although it would benefit non-itemizers and those in lower tax brackets,
it would likely adversely impact higher-rate taxpayers if it were subject to
an income phase-out. But even if efficiency is not improved, vertical
equity could be, because the results could further the idea that those who
have higher income should pay more and those with lower incomes pay
less. Higher taxes at higher income levels are also consistent with the
ability-to-pay principle.
There are also several economic justifications for permitting a
deduction for contributions to DROs. First, individuals may believe that
200. Id.
201. See id. at 1412-13.
202. Vada Waters Lindsey, The Charitable Contribution Deduction: A Historical
Review and a Look to the Future, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1056, 1095-96 (2003) (advocating a
credit for charitable contributions to permit equality of treatment between itemizers and
nonitemizers).
203. See id. at 1082 ("[T]he current [charitable contribution] scheme creates the socalled 'upside-down' subsidy. The 'upside-down' subsidy means that low-income
taxpayers will receive lower tax subsidies than high-income taxpayers because of their
lower marginal income tax rates."). See generally Eddie Baker, A Critical Analysis of the
Charitable Giving Act of 2005 and the CharitableAid, Recovery, and Empowerment Act of
2005, 7 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 323 (2006) (discussing proposals made during
2005 in both the House and Senate to permit, among other things, deduction of charitable
contributions by nonitemizers).
204. Some people might still prefer that no deduction be permitted because they do
not like the choices that are made about which causes are supported by charities.
Therefore, an argument could still be made that such a change would not achieve Pareto
optimality.
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they do not need to contribute because others will. This belief, a variant
of the free-rider problem, may lead to too little aid being available. 25 A
charitable deduction may help alleviate this problem by creating a
tangible incentive to make charitable contributions.20 ' Second, gifts to
DROs tend to provide a means of wealth redistribution.' °7 This may
cause a tax subsidy for contributions to DROs to result in a Pareto
improvement. 208
Disaster relief, along with certain other charitable purposes, may
permit justification of the charitable deduction on the grounds that the
functions performed by the charity relieve a government burden. 2 ,
Under the common law, charitable organizations were required
210 do works
community.
the
benefited
or
welfare
social
the
promoted
that
In the wake of a devastating man-made or natural disaster, most
people and companies express an interest in and willingness to help those
in need. The fact that so many say that they are interested in and willing
to help may make the free-rider problem even greater. Thus, if allowing
a greater deduction for contributions to disaster relief increases
contributions and provides more and better aid to the victims, the result
is likely a Pareto improvement. One benefit of a deduction for charitable
contributions is that it spreads the cost of providing charities' services
over all taxpayers, meaning that even those few who do not want to help
will bear little of the burden."' At the same time, those who feel strongly
about providing assistance can do so at a reduced cost.
It is more difficult to support some of the arguments that favor the
charitable deduction in some cases. An example that might be harder to
justify is the short-term acceleration of
r .212the deduction permitted for the
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami relief e
2ort. In that case, the aid was being
sent to another country. That means that United States taxpayers were
205. See Gergen, supra note 23, at 1399,1448.
206. See id. at 1448.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1449. Few would argue that no aid of any kind should be given to disaster
victims, making less likely the argument that some will be worse off because they do not in
any way want to fund relief efforts.
209. See H.R. REP. No. 75-1860, at 19 (1938) ("The exemption from taxation of money
or property devoted to charitable and other purposes is based upon the theory that the
Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden
which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the
benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare."), quoted in Bob Jones Univ.
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 590 (1983); see also Christine Holland Anthony, Note, The
Responsible Role for InternationalCharitableGrantmaking in the Wake of the September
11, 2001 TerroristAttacks, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 911,917-18 (2006).
210. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 77, § 361.
211. Fleischer, supra note 65, at 24-26.
212. Act of Jan. 7, 2005, Pub. L. 109-1, 119 Stat. 3.
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paying for a benefit to those that were hurt, displaced, or killed in
another country. Although some victims were United States tourists,
they did not make up the bulk of those in need as a result of the
tsunami.213 With respect to domestic relief, DROs often provide services
that would otherwise fall to government agencies, including providing
emergency shelter, clothing and food.214 Thus, it is not hard to see that
contributions to DROs in the United States, made to aid domestic
victims relieve a government burden.
However, whether this justification supports the requirement that
donations be made to a domestic organization is a more difficult
question, especially given that domestic DROs are not limited to
providing domestic aid, nor are foreign DROs prohibited from providing
aid in the United States. The answer depends on one's view of
government responsibility. One view is that each government has an
obligation to provide aid to other countries as members of the global
community.215 If this is the case, and the government has a responsibility
to provide foreign aid, a deduction should be available regardless of
whether contributions are made to a foreign or domestic charity, because
regardless of the charity's location, the contributions will be used to
fulfill a government obligation.
Even if a charitable deduction for contributions to foreign charitable
entities can be justified as fulfilling a government obligation to provide
global aid, oversight problems remain. The United States government
has very little ability or authority to oversee the operations of foreign
entities to ensure that funds are used for purposes that would qualify the
entity as a charitable organization in the United States.216 Moreover,
there is an added concern that the funds could be diverted to uses that
are at odds with United States foreign policy or its interests. 217
Perhaps requiring that contributions be made to a domestic
organization, which can then transfer the funds to a foreign aid
organization, or use the funds to help with foreign relief efforts is a
reasonable compromise.
This may also effectively transfer some
oversight responsibilities to the domestic charity. The domestic entity,
213. U.S. Help to Tsunami Victims "Long-Term," Powell Says, GLOBAL SECURITY,
Dec. 30, 2004, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/12/mil-041230usia05.htm.
214. See supra notes 16-19.
215. See Pozen, supra note 57, at 599-601 (discussing how a deduction for
contributions to foreign charities could generate good will toward the government, and
stating that "[a]gainst the widespread belief that the U.S. is stingy with international aid,
dismantling the water's edge policy would demonstrate our commitment to foreign
charity").
216. See supra note 93.
217. See Pozen, supra note 57, at 594-97.
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which wants to keep its tax-exempt status, has a strong incentive to
ensure that it is working with reputable aid agencies abroad, and will
only give funds to organizations that meet the United States definition of
charity. The domestic charity may also be in a better position than
individual or corporate donors to know which foreign aid agencies satisfy
the requirements of our tax laws.
Moreover, if the cost and benefit of aiding the displaced and
preventing the spread of disease is looked at on a global basis, all of
humanity benefits from the reduction of suffering.218 In fact, with respect
to the Indian Ocean tsunami, the United States government seemed to
take this position, with President George W. Bush encouraging
charitable giving to the cause,219 former Presidents Bill Clinton and
George H.W. Bush leading a fundraising drive, 2 and Congress passing
legislation to encourage additional contributions. 22' However, this may
not be an adequate justification. Since consistency in treatment is
important, there is little harm that is likely to result to the United States
tax system as long as deductible contributions are made to domestic
charities, the donor intends for the aid to go to foreign victims, and the
aid is within the mission of the charity.
It seems that the benefits conferred on disaster victims by the
availability of aid from DROs significantly outweighs the costs to
individual dissenters who do not want to subsidize charitable deductions.
As a result, expanded deductions for contributions to disaster relief will
222
Moreover, the
be, at a minimum, a Kaldor-Hicks improvement.
effectiveness of private disaster relief, at least immediately following the
disaster, may be greater than that of having the government provide
food, shelter, and water to those who have lost their homes. Although
smaller scale disasters are not as widely publicized, it still may be more
efficient for DROs, rather than government agencies, to provide aid.
C. OtherJustificationsfor Government Subsidization of PrivateRelief
In a 1988 article, Professor Mark Gergen used a variety of rationales to
explain justifications for a deduction for contributions to social service

218. Pozen, supra note 57, at 582; see also Anthony, supra note 209, at 918, 920-21;
Crimm, supra note 58, at 8, 12-13.
219. President George W. Bush, Radio Address by the President to the Nation (Jan. 8,
2005),

available at http://www.usafreedomcorps.gov/about-usafc/newsroom/speeches-

dynamic.asp?ID=841.
220. Richard W. Stevenson & Stephanie Strom, Bush Asks His Fatherand Clinton to
Raise Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2005, at A9.

221. See Act of Jan. 7, 2005, Pub. L. 109-1, 119 Stat. 3.
222. See Gergen, supra note 23, at 1412 ("If winners win more than losers lose, a policy
is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement.").
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organizations, including DROs.2 3 In the context of disaster relief,
Professor Gergen posits that giving to charitable relief might be akin to
the insurance system.224 Individuals might contribute to a disaster that
did not directly impact them, based on a belief that others would
contribute in the event they were affected by some other disaster.
However, Professor Gergen correctly dismisses the possibility, especially
when the disaster is distant and the aid primarily helps the poor. 2 5 In
dismissing this rationale, he notes the significant opportunity to free ride
226
and the unlikelihood that a donor will ever receive a reciprocal benefit.
Another rationale for providing a subsidy for charitable contributions,
such as a tax deduction, is that in some instances a private charity will be
better able to meet the needs of those to be benefited. Moreover, private
charity may be more flexible and able to adjust to changing needs than
would the government. However, neither delivery mechanism is without
problems, as evidenced by the fact that both government and private aid
227
providers experienced substantial failures following Hurricane Katrina.
In addition, the U.S. government had problems getting personnel in
place and was unable or unwilling to accept foreign aid that was offered
On the other hand,
to assist in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
charities are not always perceived as being better able to efficiently
distribute aid. For example, following the 9/11 terror attacks, many of
the charities that received aid for the victims and their survivors were
criticized for not distributing funds quickly enough. 229 For instance, the
Salvation Army offered to pay the expenses of the victims and their
families .2 This was an optimistic promise, and the Salvation Army
rapidly fell behind in performing this task because of the enormity of the
job. 231

223.
224.
225.
226.

See generally id.
Id. at 1431.
Id.
Id.

227.

See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, at 3-5.

228.

John Solomon & Spencer S. Hsu, Most Katrina Aid from Overseas Went

Unclaimed, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 2007, at Al. Unclaimed aid included "manpower,
supplies, and expertise worth untold millions," and $854 million in cash and oil that could
have been sold. Id. In addition, of the $126 million in foreign aid that was received, the
government had distributed only about half of it by February 2006. Id. Contributions
were offered by Canada, Britain, Israel, and Kuwait. Id.
229. Stephanie Strom, Families Fret as Charities Hold a Billion Dollars in 9/11 Aid,
N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2002, at A29.
230. Diana B. Henriques, Charity Overwhelmed in Bid to Meet Attack Victims' Bills,

N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2002, at Al.
231. Id.
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IV. THE PROBLEMS OF DIRECTED DONATIONS

A. Surplus Funds
Restricted gifts-gifts to charity that must be used for a purpose
specified by the donor-may ultimately be difficult for a charity to use.
When charities receive more funds than are needed for the specified
charitable purpose, the charity may spend more than is optimal to meet
the needs of the specified purpose; such spending may also result in
inadequate funding for another cause."'
This was illustrated in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks. Excess
funds may result if the number of victims and the amount of damaged
property for which the funds were donated is fixed. 233 Unprecedented
giving occurred following the attacks. 234 Much of this giving was directed
to the victims of the terror attacks and their families.235 As a result of
giving being directed to 9/11 relief, other charities received lower
contributions, which meant that those charities had less money available
to help those who depended on their assistance. 236
The excess contributions to the 9/11 funds made it difficult for charities
to accomplish their charitable missions while maintaining their status as
tax-exempt organizations.
First, specific purpose charitable
organizations that were formed to aid the victims could not fulfill their
mission and satisfy traditional guidelines for making charitable
distributions, which required distributions be based on need.237 Second,
organizations like the American Red Cross faced very negative publicity
if they redirected funds from victims of the 9/11 terror attacks to other
uses, regardless of the degree of need."'
One way that charities can address the problem caused by directed
donations is through the doctrine of cy pres: the charity could apply to a
court for permission to use the money to a help similar group, furthering
as much of the donors' intent as possible. 23 9 However, cy pres is generally
applied only if no other option exists and it has become illegal,

232. See Gergen, supra note 23, at 1425.
233. See Katz, supra note 83, at 272.
234. Id. at 252; see also supra note 76.
235. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 2, 10.
236. Daniel Gross, Zero-Sum Charity, SLATE, Jan. 20, 2005, http://www.slate.
com/id/2112485/.
237. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text; see also Katz, supra note 83, at 267
(noting that disaster relief organizations target victims who lack basic needs).
238. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
239. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. a (2003) ("The [doctrine of cy pres]
indicates the principle that, when the exact intention of the settlor is not to be carried out,
the intention will be given effect 'as nearly' as may be.").
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impossible, or impractical to realize the donor's original purpose. 240 The
Restatement (Third) of Trusts puts it this way:
Unless the terms of the trust provide otherwise, where
property is placed in trust to be applied to a designated
charitable purpose and it is or becomes unlawful, impossible, or
impracticable to carry out that purpose, or to the extent it is or
becomes wasteful to apply all of the property to the designated
purpose, the charitable trust will not fail but the court will direct
application of the property or appropriate portion thereof to a
charitable purpose that reasonably approximates the designated
purpose. 241
The donor's contribution is generally applied as nearly as possible to
the donor's intent under this doctrine. 242 However, not all charitable
contributions for which the donor's intent cannot be carried out can be
cured through the application of cy pres.24' The gift must have been
made in trust for a charitable purpose, the charitable purpose must be
recognized by the law, and the accomplishment
of• the
•
244 donor's purpose
must have become illegal, impossible, or impractical.
Many gifts will
not satisfy all of the requirements, such as in the case of the 9/11 victim
funds, which will make reformation of the gift difficult or impossible. In
the case of the 9/11 victim funds, the victims could be identified, but the
donations were such that all of their short-and long-term needs were met.
However, in the case of a surplus, where the impossibility or
impracticality of using the funds for the designated cause can be clearly
shown,
245 it may be possible to convince a court to apply the doctrine of cy
pres. However, before the doctrine of cy pres will be applied, the court
must determine whether the donor intended that surplus funds be
returned to her or her heirs rather than used for another purpose. 246
Moreover, this still does not address the negative publicity that may
accompany a diversion of funds from one disaster to another
Of course, a surplus of funds is not a problem for all widely publicized
disasters. For instance, the number of people displaced during the 2005
240. See id. ("[Cy pres] may also apply to a charitable trust if, at the time of its
creation, the particular purpose of the trust has been fully accomplished or cannot possibly
or practicably be accomplished."); see also NEWMAN, supra note 90, at 27 ("[C]y pres is
only a last resort, to be invoked where it is totally impossible for a trustee to realize the
objectives of the trust's creator through reasonable interpretation of the trust
agreement.").
241. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67.
242. Id. § 67 cmt. a; FISCH, FREED & SCHACHTER, supra note 90, § 562.
243. FISCH, FREED & SCHACHTER, supra note 90, § 572.
244. Id. §§ 572, 574.
245. Id. § 583.
246. See id.
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hurricane season was great enough to overwhelm charities' resources as
well as government disaster programs. 247 However, the potential that
there will be surplus contributions should nevertheless be considered
when drafting provisions that will encourage charitable giving.
B. Diversion from Other Uses
In the face of a highly publicized disaster, a donor may direct
charitable contributions to one or more DROs. However, this may result
in the diversion of funds from other worthwhile causes because most
donors can make only limited contributions during a year. One source of
the limitation on contributions a particular donor will make during a
single year may be the limitation on deductible charitable contributions.
Another limitation may be the amount of money that the donor has
available; the donor must balance the utility of donating to charity
against the utility of other uses of the money including personal
consumption or savings.
V. SYSTEMIC IMPROVEMENTS FROM CONSISTENT TREATMENT OF
DISASTERS BY THE TAX CODE

Temporary tax relief enacted following a disaster is not likely to be an
effective or efficient means of providing relief to the victims. First, the
legislative process is not conducive to the speed with which relief needs
to be provided to the victims of a disaster.24' Displaced or injured
disaster victims generally require immediate assistance with food,
housing, and medical care. Legislation takes time. With legislation
following a disaster, neither donors nor victims will know what to expect
in terms of relief or incentives that may be provided. Nonetheless,
temporary tax relief may be politically expedient for politicians who want
to be seen "doing something" to help victims.
In addition, because of the localized nature of disasters, there is a
tendency toward short-term, localized relief when any temporary relief is
provided. 249 Such relief may not be efficient or equitable:

247.

U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, at 17.

248. Ellen P. Aprill & Richard L. Schmalbeck, Post-DisasterTax Legislation: A Series
of Unfortunate Events, 56 DUKE L.J. 51, 52, 56-57 (2006) ("[T]he legislative process was

glacial in comparison to the dire needs developing on the ground. Hurricane Katrina hit
the Louisiana and Mississippi coastline on August 29, 2005. Two weeks passed without
legislative action .... Both the House and the Senate passed resolutions on September 21
adopting the final provisions of the Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act (KETRA)."); id. at
67-68 (describing the slow reaction to 9/11, with the tax relief bill being signed into law
more than four months after the attacks).
249. Katrina Hearing,supra note 35, at 131-32 (testimony of George K. Yin, Chief of
Staff, Joint Comm. on Taxation).
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[S]hort-lived tax relief may be problematic due to both lack of
awareness of the relief on the part of taxpayers and limited
enforcement incentives on the part of the IRS. As a result, we
might expect above-average noncompliance with such
provisions, both intentional and inadvertent, as well as belowaverage utilization. Tax provisions, especially short-lived ones,
are also not well-suited to providing benefits to low-income
beneficiaries ....
The legislation passed in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and
Wilma"' resulted in the creation of six categories of victims. 2 Each
category of victim was entitled to different tax relief.5 3 The more
categories of victims permitted by the Code, the greater the complexity
of the tax system. The greater the complexity, the harder it is for victims
to figure out to what relief they are entitled.
In addition, more categories may result in less equity as otherwise
similarly situated taxpayers are treated differently. Although it is
possible that the categories could be structured to increase equity among
victims, increased equity is not possible when the categories vary from
disaster to disaster.
Although the time period within which charitable contributions could
be made was limited following Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, the
expansion of the charitable deduction for individuals up to their adjusted
gross income permitted a benefit to accrue to nonrelief charities. As a
result, this measure was not well targeted to the disaster at hand.
Moreover, it provided a benefit to nonrelief donors that in no way aided
disaster relief. In fact, charitable giving after an adjustment for inflation
increased significantly from 2004 to 2005.5 The increase applied to
DROs such as the Red Cross International and the Salvation Army,
and also other charitable organizations. Sixty percent of the charities
responding to a survey by the Giving USA Foundation and the Center

250. Id. at 132.
251. See, e.g., Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act (KETRA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 10973, 119 Stat. 2016 (providing tax relief to Katrina victims); Gulf Opportunity Zone Act
(GO Zone Act) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-135, 119 Stat. 2577 (providing tax relief to the
victims of Hurricanes Rita and Wilma).
252. Tolan, supra note 25, at 800. Similar to tax policy, disaster relief programs should
strive to be "efficient, consistent and equitable." Barry J. Barnett, US Government
Natural Disaster Assistance: Historical Analysis and a Proposal for the Future, 23
DISASTERS 139, 144 (1999).
253. See Tolan, supra note 25, at 829-35 (outlining different tax benefits for different
classes of victims).
254. Stephanie Strom, Report Finds Disasters Fueled Rise in Giving in 2005, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 2006, at A13.
255. Id.
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for Philanthropy at Indiana University reported that they had received
more charitable contributions in 2005 than in 2004, even after adjusting
for inflation."6
One means of preventing the inequity often associated with enacting
temporary tax legislation following individual disasters would be to enact
legislation to provide relief for particular kinds of disasters.2 7 This would
address the problem that a victim made homeless by one hurricane
receives different tax benefits than a victim of another hurricane. It
could also address potential disparities in treatment to victims of a
hurricane and a flood or forest fire. However, this would require
Congress to foresee a variety of disasters and provide specific tax relief
appropriate to each. It could also add significant complexity to an
already overburdened tax system.
Adopting this solution, but limiting it to very broad categories of
disasters, would alleviate many of the potential problems. One problem
that might remain is that line-drawing questions would arise when
various disasters have overlapping elements, such as flooding, high
winds, and fires. One possible way to limit that problem would be to use
very broad classifications such as man-made disasters and natural
disasters.
Man-made disasters would include things like the Oklahoma City
bombing, the 9/11 terror attacks, and the 2001 anthrax attacks. Natural
disasters would include hurricanes, tornadoes, tsunamis, earthquakes,
floods, wildfires, and other similar events. In addition, thresholds for the
amount of damage or the number of people affected could be used to
determine the types of tax relief available. Current law is similar to this
approach, with greater relief available following a Presidentially declared
disaster than a disaster that does not receive that designation.
Ambiguity and questions regarding which category of relief is available
could still arise if different treatment is afforded based on whether the
disaster is natural or man-made. For instance, within which category
should a massive wild-fire fall if the original trigger for the fire was manmade but natural causes result in its expansion to a major disaster? Even
leaving aside the question of whether that original trigger was intentional
or accidental, this raises a number of questions. If the fire is triggered by
human action and is therefore considered man-made, and the relief
available differs from the relief provided if it had started as a result of
natural conditions, horizontal equity is harmed. This means that a new
256. Id.
257. See Aprill & Schmalbeck, supra note 248, at 69 ("A more even response to
taxpayers who are victimized in particular ways would be desirable from a tax policy
viewpoint.").
258. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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category would be needed, thereby increasing the complexity of the tax
system.
Similarly, if the dollar value of the damage or number of victims is set
as a threshold, there may still be ambiguities. For instance, it will be
necessary to determine who is a victim eligible for relief. Presidentially
declared disaster areas in some ways address this by providing a
geographic area that is covered 5 9 The geographic area could continue to
be used to determine who is eligible for relief. A different approach,
which might ensure that relief is provided to those most affected and
most in need, would be to use thresholds such as minimum harm or
maximum income. Such thresholds would potentially increase the
record-keeping burden on victims or reduce compliance. In addition,
although more accurate relief could be provided, the more thresholds
that are used, the more complexity that will be added to the system.
With respect to disaster relief, the use of a charitable deduction
permits the cost of relief to be spread across society.260 It eliminates the
free-rider problem to the extent that the cost of the charitable
contributions is placed on the tax system and the difference is added to
the overall societal tax burden. Moreover, tax preferences for charitable
contributions to disaster relief result in funding for what is arguably a
collective public good. All citizens benefit from the provision of food,
medical care, shelter, clothing and other necessary goods and services to
those that have been harmed by a disaster, even if some members of
society are unable to see how they benefit from the providing those
goods and services to someone they do not know who lives thousands of
miles away. The use of a deduction shifts some of the cost from the
donors to the rest of society. Professor Gergen theorizes that although
this shifting mechanism is imperfect, when coupled with the pleasure
donors receive from giving, it makes contribution to privately provided
public goods tolerable.261
In addition, the use of a deduction results in a relatively small cost in
government revenues compared to the cost of directly providing disaster
victims with needed relief.262 Tax subsidies may result in a lower cost to
government than direct government programs providing the same
services. 261 With a tax deduction, the government pays only a portion of

259. I.R.C. § 133(h) (2000).
260. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
261. Gergen, supra note 23, at 1409.
262. Id. at 1403.
263. See Hochman & Rodgers, supra note 192, at 3 (advocating a tax credit instead of
a deduction for charitable contributions, but noting that government subsidization is
generally preferable to direct involvement).
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the cost of the contribution to the charity. 64 The availability of a
deduction or credit may encourage individuals to make greater
contributions to charity.
However, temporary or disaster-by-disaster tax relief is less likely to be
effective. It generally will not provide immediate relief to the poor, who
are the victims who need it most.265 It takes time for legislation to make
it through Congress. In addition, it may be difficult to target the relief to
benefit only the poor.' 66 The poor often pay little or no tax and do not
generally have a financial cushion that will permit them to absorb
additional expenses associated with injury or property damage. Lower
income individuals and families will often require much more immediate
aid than can be provided by tax relief, even if they will receive some of
the benefits.
Second, as in the case of KETRA and the GO Zone Act, the
legislation may not be targeted sufficiently well to ensure that tax relief
actually goes to disaster relief. Increasing the limits on the deduction
available for charitable contributions without restricting the types of
charities to which contributions can be made
may cause contributions to
267
be made to causes other than disaster relief.
In addition, some disasters require longer-term relief than others. For
instance, many victims of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma are not
able to return to New Orleans over two years later. Estimates suggest
that about half of the pre-Katrina populations may never return.26 8
Sixteen months after the hurricanes, up to 200,000 displaced victims
remained scattered across the United States, and thousands of families
remained in FEMA trailers.269
Legislative reactions to major disasters may be both too narrowly
drawn and overly broad to address the concerns at hand, creating
disparate treatment to victims of disasters. Some victims will be swept in
to the relief offered as a result of a major disaster; for instance, the
264. Gergen, supranote 23, at 1404.
265. See Katrina Hearing, supra note 35, at 132 (testimony of George K. Yin, Chief of
Staff, Joint Comm. on Taxation).
266. JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RES. SERV., TAX POLICY OPTIONS AFTER
HURRICANE KATRINA 2, 5 (2005) ("In general, tax benefits cannot easily be targeted to
lower income individuals."); see also Tolan, supra note 25, at 837-39.

267. The increase in charitable giving in 2005, even apart from giving to disaster relief,
may support this possibility. See supra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
268. See Adam Nossiter, New Orleans of Future May Stay Half Its Old Size, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2007, at All.
269. Bob Herbert, The Not Wanted Signs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2007, at A19. However,
as a result of CDC studies indicating unexpectedly high levels of formaldehyde in the
FEMA trailers, FEMA has expedited its plans to move victims out of its trailers. See
supra note 158.
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victims of Hurricanes Rita and Wilma received much, but not all, of the
relief offered to victims of Hurricane Katrina.27 ° Similarly, the victims of
the Oklahoma City bombing and the anthrax attacks were rolled into
some of the 9/11 relief.271 Rolling the victims of an earlier disaster into
the relief provided to victims of subsequent disasters increases equity
among these disaster victims, but it does not create equity for victims of
all disasters. Moreover, the relief enacted may be different from disaster
to disaster, as has been the case following recent disasters, which reduces
certainty in the tax law and decreases the equity of treatment among
taxpayers.
John Rawls suggested that in structuring a just society the rules of law
should be constructed from behind a "veil of ignorance.""' Behind the
"veil," one would not know where one would fall within the society in
terms of position or social status. 73 Because those who wrote the rules
could possibly wind up as the least fortunate in society, they would
design rules that would be fair across all of society. 274
Rawls posited that those designing the rules for a just society would
consider the worst possible outcomes and would strive to obtain the best
275
of the worst possible outcomes, which he called the "maximin.,
Starting from behind the veil of ignorance, those making the rules would
have an incentive to achieve the maximin because they would not know
at the outset the position that they would occupy, or if they might be
victims of a disaster.276

Using such a model to design disaster relief may be more realistic than
using such a model to redesign all of the laws that apply to society as a
whole. Disasters by their very nature do not distinguish between rich
and poor or powerful and weak, although some types of disasters may be
more likely to affect one group over another. If broad-based rules are

270. See generally Gulf Opportunity Zone Act (GO Zone Act) of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-135, 119 Stat. 2577; see also Tolan, supra note 25, at 841-42.
271. I.R.C. § 692(d)(4) (Supp. V 2005); see also Aprill & Schmalbeck, supra note 248,
at 69 ("[W]hen one disaster is so great that it seems to call for heaving congressional
artillery, other, smaller but more or less similar disasters get caught up in the wave.").
272. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (rev. ed. 1999).
273. Id.
274.

See id.

275. Id. at 132-33.
276. See id. The bulk of the property damages and deaths in New Orleans occurred
among families that were living in poverty. See ALAN BERUBE & BRUCE KATZ, THE
BROOKINGS INSTIT., KATRINA'S WINDOW: CONFRONTING CONCENTRATED POVERTY

ACROSS

AMERICA

2

(2005), available at http://www3.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/

20051012_concentratedpoverty.pdf; ARLOC SHERMAN & ISAAC SHAPIRO, CTR. ON
BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, ESSENTIAL FACTS ABOUT THE VICTIMS OF
HURRICANE KATRINA 2 (2005), availableat http://www.cbpp.org/9-19-05pov.pdf.
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designed before the occurrence of a disaster and then applied equally to
all disasters, equity will be increased.
As a result, before the occurrence of the next mega-disaster, it would
be advisable to consider the results of recent mega-disasters, as well as
both current charitable giving laws and the temporary measures that
followed these and other mega-disasters. After such study, legislation
could be designed that would address equity concerns and optimize
contributions to disaster relief.
VI. CONCLUSION
The tax system is not well-suited to be a primary delivery mechanism
for disaster relief, especially through temporary post-disaster legislation.
Legislation tends to be slow moving, as a result of the time required to
get an act through Congress. However, providing temporary tax relief
may be politically popular. Congress may feel compelled to enact relief
legislation to prove that it is doing something to relieve the victims'
suffering.
In addition, congressional action is likely only in the wake of massive
disasters like the 9/11 terror attacks, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, and
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. Without intense media attention,
there may not be sufficient pressure from the legislators' constituents, far
from the disaster, to cause legislators to act. However, the victims of less
widely publicized disasters need help no less than the victims of more
high profile disasters.
Sound tax policy generally requires that there be equity between
taxpayers who are similarly situated and that taxes be imposed based on
a taxpayer's ability to pay. The temporary relief provisions enacted in
the wake of recent massive disasters violated both of these principles.
Many temporary relief provisions for disaster relief are hastily crafted
and often not well targeted. This is clearly seen in the increase in the
limitations on charitable contributions for individuals in KETRA and the
GO Zone Act. The increase in giving to other charities, even after
adjustment for inflation, is evidence that at least this part of the
legislation was not effective. This increase in individual giving to
charities with purposes other than disaster relief may also be inefficient.
Moreover, temporary tax relief legislation is not be an efficient means
of encouraging charitable contributions or getting aid to disaster victims.
Because of their temporary nature, the contributions may not get where
they are needed most. Temporary relief is often inefficient.
Congress should adopt a single set of tax provisions to be applied to
disaster relief. In doing so, there should be careful study of the
behavioral impact of each of the approaches that have been taken in
each of the temporary provisions relating to disaster relief. Moreover,
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such legislation should be undertaken without the pressure of a recent
disaster. Once disaster relief has been addressed, it should not be hastily
modified in the face of new disasters. Although there will not be the
same pressure to pass this legislation without a crush of victims from a
recently past disaster, post-disaster legislation generally cannot be
completed in time to provide meaningful relief to the victims.
Perhaps the Rawlsian maximin would be helpful. If the veil of
ignorance is applied, those writing the policy cannot know whether they
will fall victim to a disaster, therefore they have an incentive to ensure
that even if they are among the unfortunate, they will receive adequate
aid, which could result in a better tax model. An increase in the equity,
efficiency, and effectiveness of the tax code, as well as improving its
adherence to the ability-to-pay principle, will benefit all taxpayers. Such
improvements could also improve our ability to get relief to the victims
of disasters, both here and abroad. If the aid is more easily obtained and
distributed, all of society is better off. In addition, victims will be able to
quickly get the aid that they need and the donors will be able to ensure
that their contributions will go to help the project or cause that the donor
thinks is most important.
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